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BOOK REVIEWS 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition, by Alasdair MacIntyre. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1990. Pp. x and 241. $24.95 cloth. 
Reviewed by RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, University of Kansas. 
The chapters of this book are the ten Gifford Lectures MacIntyre delivered 
at the University of Edinburgh in 1988. In them he contrasts three approaches 
to philosophy and particularly to moral theory. The first is epitomized by the 
Ninth Edition of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica, with its conception of ethics 
as a science in which progress is possible. The second he calls genealogy 
after Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, a method he finds continued by 
Michel Foucault. The third is Thomism, championed in Pope Leo XIII's encyc-
lical Aeterni Patris, which led to the requirement that the theology of Thomas 
Aquinas be taught in Catholic seminaries and to the revival of Thomistic 
philosophy in Catholic schools. 
The book is primarily an interpretative history of the three versions of 
moral enquiry, written from the acknowledge partisan view of a follower of 
Aquinas. In his lectures MacIntyre continues the themes he presented in After 
Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? His basic claim is that Thom-
ism alone of the three versions of moral enquiry can account for the insights 
and failures of the other two positions, and so it emerges as rationally superior 
to them. The claim is not defended in such a way that all readers will be 
convinced of its truth, but then MacIntyre holds that only those who accept 
the Thomistic position can see its superiority from within. As a partisan, he 
places the Thomistic tradition in its best light as a flexible approach to 
morality. By contrast he saddles the encyclopaedists with their nineteenth-
century dogmatic statements in Brittanica, and plays down the fact that few 
if any of their heirs hold such views today. 
MacIntyre is at his best in describing historical positions. His own position 
is less than clear and frustratingly vague at crucial points. Those who had hoped 
that perhaps in this book Macintyre might present his own substantive moral 
theory, a virtue ethic that would overcome the shortcomings of utilitarianism, 
Kantianism, and contractarianism, will be disappointed. The closest he comes to 
doing so is to endorse Aquinas' position in which morality and theology are 
inextricably and necessarily intertwined. In addition to virtue MacIntyre em-
phasizes that obedience to divine law is also "required if we are to achieve 
our good" (p. 130). The implicit conclusion is that MacIntyre does not believe 
a strictly philosophical virtue-based ethics is possible. 
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Macintyre articulately exposes the inner workings of Augustinianism, of 
Aristotelianism, of Nietzsche and Foucault, and of the British en-
cyclopaedists. If his thesis that we each see only through the lenses of our 
own system is correct, it is puzzling how he can so clearly see other positions, 
how he can bring us to see them, and why both he and we cannot evaluate 
them on the basis of their internal strengths and weaknesses, whatever our 
own philosophical position. 
Although MacIntyre frequently refers to tradition, exactly what tradition 
he embraces is not clear. For the most part he cites and explains the position 
of Thomas Aquinas. He also cites, though not often or at length Pope Leo 
XIII, suggesting that by "tradition" he might mean the tradition of the Cath-
olic Church. Whether that tradition includes Vatican II or the periods of the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when Thomism was not in 
great favor, is unclear. He contrasts the Aristotelian and the Augustinian 
traditions. Whether they are part of the Thomistic tradition, which superseded 
them, is also not clear. Even the suggestion that the tradition he extols is a 
tradition since Aquinas is confusing, since it seems to exclude many of the 
later scholastics and Thomists with whom MacIntyre disagrees. If we are to 
build on a tradition we must know what that tradition is, and we must know 
how to learn from it. MacIntyre never makes either explicit for his reader. 
The history of Thomism since Aeterni Patris has been mixed. Joseph 
Marechal sought to reconcile Thomism with Kant. Others have tried to rec-
oncile it with phenomenology and existentialism; still others with analytic 
philosophy. After a hundred years Thomism has been losing rather than gain-
ing influence in American Catholic universities and on the international phil-
osophical scene. In an otherwise very articulate book, Macintyre never makes 
clear how we are to use whatever in Thomism he believes valuable. 
Aquinas held that man's end transcended this life. He adopted what might 
be called the Judeo-Christian view of morality as developed through the 
doctrine of the Church, but he also argued from natural law. For him the two 
were compatible. But both have been critiqued, as has their compatibility. 
Macintyre does not specify exactly what he is proposing in this regard, he 
does not mention the critiques and the problems they raise, and he does not 
tell us whether the authority to which we are to submit is the authority of the 
Pope, of the Church taken more broadly, of God (known how?), of the Bible 
(interpreted by whom?), or of some figure or figures within the Thomistic 
tradition as he envisions it. He is silent on the differences within the Catholic 
Church on moral questions. 
Although MacIntyre claims that genuine incommensurability "can only be 
recognized and characterized by someone who inhabits both alternative 
schemes" (p. 114), he helps us appreciate the incommensurability of Au-
gustinian theology and Aristotelianism at the University of Paris. He clearly 
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and brilliantly characterizes the task Aquinas faced of reconciling the philos-
ophy of Aristotle with the Augustinian theological tradition influenced by 
Platonism. Each tradition had its own view of truth and its own world view 
available to those inside it. MacIntyre argues that the Augustinians and the 
Aristotelians of St. Thomas' day were unable to understand each other, since 
each side argued from its own position. Aquinas, through his teacher Albertus 
Magnus, was able to learn both traditions from within, and was thus able to do 
justice to both in his remarkable synthesis. He was able to give an internal 
critique of each position to show its shortcomings, and then he was able to show 
how these shortcomings could be overcome in the new position he developed. 
The accomplishment of Thomas Aquinas was not to side with either but to 
find a third way that did justice to both positions, while avoiding their limi-
tations. The example does not show that one side was able to demonstrate 
itself superior to its opponent, but that both were incorporated into a new 
system that is superior to both. Although some people and philosophers are 
so narrowly committed to their presuppositions that they cannot appreciate 
the strengths of other positions, this does not seem to be a universal malady. 
If we learn from Aquinas how to form a new system from competing old 
ones, why is this not a model for us today? Why opt, as MacIntyre does, for 
an existing system-Thomism? Why not rather reconcile contemporary mod-
ern science, modern philosophy, and Thomism, as Aquinas reconciled Augus-
tine and Aristotle? Yet that is not what MacIntyre suggests. For him modern 
philosophy is a mistake to be ignored or refuted, and we are to take over 
Thomas Aquinas' thirteenth-century forms and fill them with twentieth-cen-
tury content. Yet he rejects, for instance, Jacques Maritain's attempt to incor-
porate into Thomism a doctrine of human rights such as found in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights. If MacIntyre's Thomism is an updated Thom-
ism with contemporary content, then unless MacIntyre equates that with the 
teachings of the Catholic Church, we are still waiting for him to show us in 
detail what such a system contains. He says that Aquinas' answers to each 
question in the Summa Theologiae are incomplete insofar as they were simply 
the "best answer reached so far" (p. 124), and that "Except for the finality of 
Scripture and dogmatic tradition, there is and can be no finality" (p. 125). 
But beyond that he is mute on the morality for our time and place. 
Both Aristotle and Aquinas formulated a theory that accounted for the 
morality of their times. MacIntyre does not either attempt to do this or suggest 
that this be done. Instead he vacillates between two tasks. One is the refor-
mation of society, turning it into a (Catholic?) community with cohesive values. 
The other is the philosophical task of developing an ethics that is part of a larger 
system that also includes, and perhaps is even founded on, theology. 
Aquinas sought a grounding for morality in an age of faith. The modern 
philosophers whom MacIntyre opposes seek a secular grounding for morality. 
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As best one can tell, Macintyre wants to retrieve the grounding for morality 
based on faith. But since the political and most other realms of society are 
secular and not founded on faith, he must convert society to make it the 
appropriate kind of society for the theologically based morality he wants to 
defend. Philosophers typically reinterpret the world, rather than change it. 
Both Aristotle and Aquinas provided a rationale for the virtues and the good 
life accepted in their societies. Macintyre implicitly reverses the role, and in 
this instance seems closer to Marx than to Aquinas; but his refonnation is to 
come about from rational debate rather than from changing economic struc-
tures. We are to reject the growing and powerful doctrine of human rights as 
individualistic. We are to return in morality to a sense of community. But 
since we do not experience community of the requisite sort in society, we 
must change society so we can apply the proper morality. 
If contemporary society is in as bad shape as MacIntyre claims, it is un-
likely that his call for the acceptance of Thomism, which first requires con-
version of some sort, can succeed. If he is right, he cannot convince people 
intellectually until they first believe the general truth of his claims, and 
implicitly those of Catholicism, which although not contrary to reason cannot 
be attained by reason alone and require religious faith. What role Thomistic 
morality can thus play in contemporary secular society is far from clear. Nor 
can one tell from the lectures whether Thomism is to supply the morality for 
the world and pressing global problems or only for those countries within the 
western philosophical tradition, as it developed together with Christianity 
through the thirteenth century. 
As to the intellectual task, this work like his earlier ones places great 
emphasis on debate between positions holding fundamentally opposed views 
of rationality. Yet it is difficult to determine with any clarity or certainty 
Maclntyre's conception of rationality and its relation to religious faith. For 
Aquinas and most others faith cannot be reached simply by reason. 
In the final chapter Macintyre draws some implications for the university. 
He is opposed to the liberal university and argues for a university in which 
there is "constrained disagreement" (p. 231) such that we may be able to see 
the correctness of Thomism as interpreted by Macintyre. He claims that 
Thomists and others who argue for moral and theological justification cannot 
be heard in any authentic and systematic way in the liberal university and he 
calls for new ways to allow those voices to be heard. 
In the nineteen thirties Mortimer Adler at the University of Chicago de-
fended Thomism against all comers. His lectures and debates drew students 
in droves. The debates were not required, nor was the university especially 
structured for them. University structures do not preclude Macintyre and 
others who want to argue the importance of theology to morality from being 
similarly heard-and Macintyre has been heard by many, as his invitation to 
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give these lectures illustrates. Contemporary interest in virtue ethics suggests 
that as he and others in the tradition he evokes (whichever it is) present a 
substantive ethical theory that shows itself adequate to the times and a true 
competitor of Kantianism, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and human rights 
theory, it will have an audience. 
If MacIntyre wants to be heard more, he must produce the substantive 
theory that will engage his opponents. Simply to claim that Saint Thomas has 
the solution to the ethical and philosophical problems of our times is a move 
that has been tried in Catholic schools for over a hundred years, with less 
than compelling success. The medieval Church's position on the immorality 
of usury might lead one to question authoritative Church pronouncements on 
some moral issues, and many Catholics have come to question the position 
of today's Catholic magisterium on the immorality of contraception, espe-
cially when the position is defended by natural law arguments rather than by 
authority. MacIntyre does not deal with these or other substantive issues. He 
relishes uncovering and emphasizing contemporary dilemmas, while he un-
derplays the consensus on everyday morality that holds that wanton killing, 
lying, and stealing are wrong, or that persons deserve respect, and he also 
underplays the growing transcultural agreements on the value of human free-
dom and the importance of human rights. 
With After Virtue, Whose Justice 7 Which Rationality 7, and the present work 
we know clearly what MacIntyre attacks. We also know his views on the 
incommensurability of philosophical positions, and his pessimism about the 
state of society, morality, and the university. This volume argues for a method. 
The proof of whether it is in fact superior to alternative and opposing methods 
will be whether it can yield a moral theory adequate to the times. This series 
of lectures claims that it can; but the lectures contain only a promise. 
The God Who Commands, by Richard J. Mouw. Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame press, 1990. Pp. vii and 214. $24.95 cloth. 
Reviewed by JANINE MARIE !DZIAK, Loras College. 
Mouw has undertaken an examination of the much discussed divine command 
ethical theory from a specifically Calvinist perspective. The book is Calvinist 
not in the sense of being a strict historical study of particular divine command 
moralists from that tradition, but in the sense of trying to capture the overall 
spirit of Calvinist theology. Much of the book draws upon previously pub-
lished essays by Mouw. Thus the range of issues is wide, and the discussion 
sometimes digresses from an ethics of divine commands per se to such topics 
as Alasdair MacIntyre's exposition of the Reformation view of the "self," 
Christian hedonism, and even medical ethics. 
